AUKUS and the risk of preparing for yesterday's war

Abstract

Australia’s commitment to the AUKUS partnership represents one of the most significant defence and industrial policy decisions in its modern history. While framed as a necessary response to evolving strategic conditions in the Indo-Pacific, AUKUS embeds Australia in a multi-decade program centred on nuclear-powered submarines and advanced defence technologies.

This article argues that the legal, regulatory and industrial complexity of AUKUS risks locking Australia into a capability framework that may be misaligned with the accelerating shift toward autonomous, data-driven warfare. It contends that AUKUS should be rebalanced within a broader defence strategy that prioritises flexibility, technological adaptability and emerging domains of conflict.

A Introduction

AUKUS is fast becoming Australia’s most expensive bet on yesterday’s war.

The trilateral security partnership between Australia, United Kingdom and United States, announced in 2021, centres on the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and the development of advanced military capabilities. It has been framed as essential to deterrence and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Yet the strategic premise underpinning AUKUS, large, stealth platforms designed for prolonged undersea operations, was conceived in an earlier era of warfare. Contemporary conflict is increasingly defined by autonomous systems, distributed networks and real-time data integration.

The central question is not whether AUKUS will be delivered, but whether it will remain strategically relevant when it is.

B AUKUS as a regulatory and legal construct

AUKUS is often discussed in strategic or political terms. In practice, it is equally a legal and regulatory construct of considerable complexity.

At its core is the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion technology to a non-nuclear weapon state. This raises novel issues under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the safeguards framework administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. While the AUKUS partners have emphasised their commitment to non-proliferation obligations, naval nuclear propulsion occupies an under-developed area of international law, with limited precedent and evolving state practice.¹

For Australia, implementation requires the creation of an entirely new domestic nuclear regulatory architecture. This includes legal frameworks governing safety, waste management, transport, storage and long-term stewardship of nuclear material. These are not peripheral considerations; they are foundational to the operation of the program and will persist for decades.²

C Export controls and technology transfer

AUKUS Pillar II introduces a further layer of complexity through reforms to export control regimes across the three partner states.

These reforms are intended to facilitate closer collaboration in areas such as artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, quantum technologies and undersea systems. However, they also require participants to navigate overlapping and evolving regulatory frameworks, including licensing requirements, technology classification and compliance obligations across multiple jurisdictions.³

The management of dual-use technologies, those with both civilian and military applications, raises additional challenges in relation to intellectual property, data sharing and security controls.

The result is a dense compliance environment that may favour large incumbents while creating barriers to entry for smaller, innovative firms.

D Procurement, industrial policy and sovereignty

The delivery of AUKUS depends on long-term procurement models and the development of domestic industrial capacity.

Australia must expand its shipbuilding capability, develop a specialised workforce and establish resilient supply chains. This reflects a broader emphasis on industrial sovereignty ensuring that critical defence capabilities can be sustained domestically.⁴

However, this objective introduces tension between national security imperatives and commercial efficiency. Large-scale defence procurement is inherently slow, capital intensive and subject to political and budgetary constraints. The coordination required across three jurisdictions with differing legal systems and procurement practices further compounds this complexity.

E Strategic misalignment: platforms versus systems

The most significant risk associated with AUKUS is strategic rather than legal.

Recent conflicts, including those in Ukraine and the Middle East, demonstrate the increasing effectiveness of relatively low-cost, rapidly deployable technologies such as drones, autonomous vehicles and sensor networks. These systems are scalable, adaptable and capable of delivering asymmetric effects against traditional military platforms.

By contrast, nuclear-powered submarines represent highly concentrated capability with long development timelines and limited flexibility once deployed. Their strategic value depends on assumptions about the future character of conflict that may not hold.

This creates a potential misalignment between the capabilities being prioritised and the direction in which warfare is evolving.

F International law and strategic stability

AUKUS also has broader implications for international law and strategic stability.

The transfer of sensitive military technologies and the expansion of defence collaboration among a small group of states may influence the development of customary international law, particularly in relation to non-proliferation, maritime security and the use of the oceans.⁵

While AUKUS partners emphasise consistency with the rules-based international order, critics argue that it may contribute to regional militarisation and erode existing norms. These competing interpretations are likely to persist as the program develops.

G Rebalancing Australia’s defence strategy

AUKUS should not be viewed as inherently flawed. Nuclear-powered submarines may continue to provide strategic value in specific contexts, particularly in deterrence and intelligence gathering.

However, the scale and duration of the investment risk crowding out alternative capabilities that are more aligned with emerging forms of warfare.

A more balanced approach would involve:

• increased investment in autonomous systems and robotics

• expansion of cyber and data capabilities

• development of distributed, networked defence architectures

• shorter procurement cycles to accommodate rapid technological change

Such a strategy would preserve the benefits of AUKUS while mitigating the risk of technological and strategic lock-in.

H Conclusion

AUKUS represents a profound commitment of financial, industrial and strategic resources.

Its success should not be measured solely by the delivery of submarines, but by its contribution to Australia’s long-term security in an evolving strategic environment.

Without recalibration, there is a real risk that Australia will complete one of the most ambitious defence programs in its history—only to find that the nature of warfare has already moved on.

Footnotes

1. International Atomic Energy Agency, Safeguards and Verification under the NPT (IAEA, ongoing framework); United Nations, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 1 July 1968, 729 UNTS 161 (entered into force 5 March 1970).

2. Australian Government, AUKUS Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway (2023); Department of Defence (Cth), public statements on nuclear stewardship obligations.

3. See discussion in Lexology article: “AUKUS: legal and regulatory considerations” (21 April 2026).

4. Australian Government, Defence Strategic Review (2023); Department of Defence (Cth), AUKUS industrial base commentary.

5. For discussion of evolving norms, see general commentary on maritime security and non-proliferation frameworks under the NPT and related state practice.